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AGENDA SETTING IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS: THE
EFFECT OF IDEOLOGY ON EN BANC REHEARINGS
Phil Zarone*
INTRODUCTION
Scholars have long recognized the critical importance of
"agenda setting" in politics.' Simply put, agenda setting refers
to the process by which an issue enters the public consciousness
and is acted upon by policymakers' Issues that do not reach the
agenda do not get decided, and the status quo prevails. Tracking
which issues are addressed and which issues are ignored can
provide a unique insight into political behavior.
The concept of agenda setting can also be useful in
understanding the behavior of judges on the United States courts
of appeals. Normally, of course, judges on the courts of appeals
have no control over their agenda and are compelled to decide
all cases brought before them. There is, however, an important
exception. When judges vote to rehear a case en banc, they have
the discretion to determine which issues will receive the
attention of the full court and be favored with all the authority
that an en banc opinion commands. The en banc process gives
judges on a court of appeals the unique opportunity to shape
their own agenda, and thus the law of the circuit, by reaching out
and deciding cases that are important to them.
Numerous aspects of judicial agenda setting are worthy of
study. For example, the manner in which en banc decisions are
* B.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1989; M.A., Ohio State University, 1994; J.D.,
University of Pittsburgh, 1998; Associate, Horty, Springer & Mattem, Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. The author is grateful to Professor Arthur Hellman at the University of
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subsequently treated by other courts and the subject matter of en
banc decisions both say something important about the behavior
of a court of appeals. This study proposes a methodology for
examining one crucial aspect of judicial agenda setting: the role
of ideology in the selection of cases for en banc review and their
subsequent resolution by the full court.
At the outset, it is worth noting that measures of ideology,
which are difficult under any circumstance, are especially
problematic in the judicial context because of the doctrine of
stare decisis. It is no doubt true that judges generally do follow
precedent. This article does not mean to suggest otherwise. The
problem in analyzing judicial decisions, then, is to separate the
effects of ideology from the effects of stare decisis.
The measures proposed in this article are premised on the
notion that ideological voting is more likely to be found in cases
in which there is a dissenting opinion.3 The presence of a dissent
suggests that the law governing a case may have been unclear,
or that settled law could have been applied differently to a
specific set of facts. In such instances, judges may be more
likely to resort to other factors, such as their ideological
predispositions, to guide their decisionmaking. Thus, the
measures developed here rely on the existence of a dissenting
opinion to signal the presence of ideological voting.
Section 1 of this article evaluates the amount of discretion
that judges have in shaping the court's agenda through use of the
en banc process. It reviews the legal authority for en banc
rehearings, and concludes that rehearings are appropriate only to
resolve intra-circuit conflict or to address questions of
"exceptional importance. '' 4 However, this legal authority does
not dictate that en banc majorities treat all questions of
exceptional importance equally. Thus, there is nothing to
preclude an en banc majority from systematically rehearing
certain types of exceptionally important cases while refusing to
rehear other exceptionally important cases.
3. Professor Arthur Hellman from the University of Pittsburgh School of Law
suggested this measure to me. Any errors in developing and applying it are, of course,
mine.
4. FED. R. App. P. 35.
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The article next addresses the manner in which courts of
appeals have actually used en banc rehearings. Section II
discusses the method by which panel decisions were identified
for inclusion in this study and classified as either liberal or
conservative. Section III applies this method to evaluate the use
of en banc rehearings in the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeals in 1995 and 1996.
The data in Section III show that en banc courts reviewed
liberal panel decisions much more frequently than they reviewed
conservative panel decisions, and that each liberal panel decision
that was reviewed was also reversed These findings suggest
that ideology played a significant role in the decision to rehear
these cases en banc. However, a review of the cases that were
reversed en banc also suggests that the great majority of them
satisfied the test for "exceptional importance," and thus
qualified for en banc review. Therefore, even if en banc
majorities used rehearings in an ideological manner, it is
difficult to argue that doing so was inconsistent with the
underlying legal authority.
Section IV then considers the effect of the ideological use
of en banc rehearings. A sample of panel decisions in the areas
of civil rights, employment discrimination, and criminal law is
evaluated to determine how often liberals in the Fourth Circuit
won at the panel level, and whether en banc rehearings were
used to reverse a significant number of these liberal victories.
The data show that 14 of the 25 liberal panel victories in the
sample qualified as "true" liberal victories. Of these 14 cases, 6
were reversed by the en banc court, suggesting that the en banc
process can be an effective mechanism for enforcing the
majority's views.
I. STANDARDS FOR GRANTING EN BANC REVIEW
One of the most important arguments advanced by
proponents of en banc rehearings is that they allow a majority of
5. Technically, an en banc court does not "reverse" a panel decision. Rather, the
panel decision is vacated by a vote to rehear the case en banc, and the en banc court either
affirms or reverses the lower court decision. However, for ease of reference, this article will
discuss "reversals" of panel decisions.
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judges in the circuit to determine the circuit's law. Advocates of
en banc review argue that two judges on a panel should not have
the power to bind the circuit to precedent with which a majority
of the circuit disagrees.6 This argument has intuitive appeal,
given the tradition of representative institutions in the United
States. However, critics argue that appellate courts are not
representative bodies akin to legislatures, so the degree to which
a panel reflects the will of the majority is irrelevant.7
The debate over majority rule reflects a difference of
opinion over the relationship between a panel and the full court.
The notion that majority rule is proper assumes that panels are
merely agents of the full court, bound to follow the preferences
of the circuit majority. In contrast, deference to panel decisions
requires that one see panels and the circuit court as the same.
Congressional and Supreme Court guidance support the
view that a circuit court is comprised of all its members, and that
panels are merely agents of the full court. At first glance, this
conclusion may seem to suggest that an ideological majority
should be free to use the en banc process to reverse panel
decisions with which it disagrees. However, Congress and the
Supreme Court have also indicated that the use of panels
constitutes a delegation of power by the full court to the panel,
6. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1034 (1991); Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal
Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. Prr. L.
REV. 805, 823 (1993); Stephen Wermiel, Reagan and the Courts: Full-Court Review of
Panel Rulings Becomes Tool Often Used by Reagan Judges Aiming to Mold Law, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 22, 1988 (quoting one judge as stating that en banc rehearings are "a
stabilizing process that makes sure the majority's voice is heard"). As used in this paper, a
majority "disagrees" with a panel result when there are two equally tenable positions on an
issue and the panel and majority prefer different sides. This differs from a majority
asserting that a panel has "erred," which is interpreted here to mean that the panel has
taken a "clearly erroneous" position.
7. As Judge Edwards noted in Bartlett ex rel. Neuman v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (per curiam) (Edwards, J., concurring):
Underlying the dissenters' calls for rehearings en banc ... is the implicit view
that every time a majority of the judges disagree with a panel decision, they
should get rid of it by rehearing the case en banc. The error in this proposition is
the concept that it is somehow desirable that majority rule should determine the
outcome of cases. However salutary that principle may be in the context of
popularly elected legislatures where a majority decision reflects the will of the
voters who chose the lawmakers, it has no equivalent value in an intermediate
court of review.
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and that such delegation should only be withdrawn under certain
circumstances. It is these circumstances that are at issue in this
article.
This section concludes that a majority's dissatisfaction with
a panel result, absent intra-circuit conflict or a question of
"exceptional importance," does not qualify as a reason to
remove the power to decide a case from the panel.8 At the same
time, not all questions of exceptional importance must be treated
equally, and an en banc majority is free to rehear certain types of
"exceptionally important" cases while ignoring others.
A. History of En Banc Rehearings
The en banc rehearing originated in the Third Circuit in
1940.9 At that time, conflicting statutory language created
uncertainty as to the size of circuit courts. On one hand, the
Judicial Code of 1911 stated that "a circuit court of appeals ...
shall consist of three judges."' 0 On the other hand, the statute
authorized four judges in the Second, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits, and later amendments added fourth and fifth judges to
other circuits." In 1938, the Ninth Circuit looked to the language
of the original 1911 statute in concluding that "[s]ince no more
than three judges may sit in the Circuit Court of Appeals, there
is no method of hearing or rehearing by a larger number."'2
However, two years later the Third Circuit reached the opposite
conclusion, and found that a circuit court consisted of all the
judges appointed to the circuit. 3 In 1941, in Textile Mills
Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, '4 the Supreme Court endorsed
8. FED. R. APP. P. 35.
9. See Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940), aftid,
314 U.S. 326 (1941).
10. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 6, at 1009 (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, §
117, 36 Stat. 1131).
11. See id. (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 118, 36 Stat. 1131 (authorizing four
judges in the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits); Act of June 10, 1930, ch. 437, 46 Stat.
538 (adding fourth judge to the Fifth Circuit); Act of June 10, 1930, ch. 438, 46 Stat. 538
(adding fourth judge to Third Circuit); Act of June 29, 1936, ch. 753, 49 Stat. 1903 (adding
fifth judge to Third Circuit)).
12. See Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir. 1938).
13. See Textile Mills, 117 F.2d at 70-71.
14. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
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this result, and en banc procedures were codified by Congress in
1948."5 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, which was
promulgated in 1968, provides additional authority and guidance
for en banc rehearings.6
B. Legal Authority for En Banc Rehearings
The debate over the propriety of en banc rehearings is
usually waged in the utilitarian language of cost-benefit
analysis.1 7 Commentators have focused on issues such as
uniformity and finality of law, cost and delay, and collegiality,
and have tried to conduct a balancing analysis to determine
whether rehearings are desirable or not. While these analyses
are useful, they ignore what should be the primary question in
evaluating the use of rehearings: When are they appropriate
according to the underlying legal authority?
The question of legal authority begins with the relationship
between the panel and the full court. Evidence that the power of
a circuit court is vested in all its judges, not its panels, is implicit
in Textile Mills' holding that a circuit court could rehear a case
en banc. The Court in that case expressly stated the following:
We cannot conclude, however, that the word "court" as
used in those other provisions of the Judicial Code means
only three judges. That would not only produce a most
awkward situation; it would on all matters disenfranchise
15. See Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, Pub. L. No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 871-72
(1948) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994)).
16. These authorities mandate that the decision to rehear a case en banc is to be made
by a majority vote "of the circuit judges of the circuit who are in regular active service."
28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1994). However, the circuits disagree on whether recused judges meet
this criterion. See, e.g., Note, Playing With Numbers: Determining the Majority of Judges
Required to Grant En Banc Sittings in the United States Courts of Appeals, 70 VA. L. REV.
1505 (1984). The same ambiguity applies to the composition of en banc courts, since they
also are to include "all circuit judges in regular active service." 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). En banc
courts may include senior circuit judges who were members of the panel whose decision is
under review. However, participation of the senior judge is at his or her own discretion. See
id. Suggestions for rehearing en banc may be made sua sponte or by petition of the
litigants. FED. R. APP. P. 35; see also Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co.,
345 U.S. 247 (1953).
17. See Stein, supra note 6, at 819-20.
18. See Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29, 41
(1988).
AGENDA SETTING IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
some circuit judges against the clear intendment of § 118.
Nor can we conclude that the word "court" means only
three judges when the court is sitting, but all the judges
when other functions are performed. Certainly there is no
specific authority for that construction. And it is difficult to
reach that conclusion by inference. For to do so would be to
imply that Congress prohibited some circuit judges from
participation in the most important function of the "court"
(the hearing and the decision of appeals), though allowing
all of them to perform the other functions."
Similarly, the Court in United States v. American-Foreign
Steamship Corp. noted that en banc courts "are convened only
when extraordinary circumstances exist that call for authoritative
consideration and decision by those charged with the
administration and development of the law of the circuit."'
Thus, power in a circuit court is held by its full complement of
active judges.
Although it is clear that power in a circuit court resides in
all its judges, it is also clear that Congress intended to preserve
the tradition of three-judge panels when it codified Textile Mills
in 1948. Congress passed legislation providing that " [i]n each
circuit the court may authorize the hearing and determination of
cases and controversies by separate panels, each consisting of
three judges." 2' Congress also provided that the full court could
withdraw this delegation of power to panels by voting to rehear
a case en banc.22 However, Congress did not say when the grant
of power to the panel could be withdrawn. Thus, for many years
circuit courts could rely only on limited Supreme Court
precedent to determine when rehearings en banc were proper.
When the Supreme Court first approved the use of
rehearings in 1941, it stated only that "[use of the en banc
rehearing] makes for more effective judicial administration.
Conflicts within a circuit will be avoided. Finality of decision in
19. Textile Mills Sec. Corp v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 333 (1941).
20. 363 U.S. 685, 689 (1960) (emphasis added).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1994). The statute makes an exception for the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit, which may sit in panels of more than three judges. 28 U.S.C. §
46(c).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c).
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the circuit courts of appeal will be promoted."23 Thus, the initial
Court justification for en banc rehearings did not rely on the
theory that the panel should represent the will of the majority.
The Court addressed en banc rehearings again in 1953.24 In
a separate opinion, Justice Frankfurter noted that:
Rehearings en banc by these courts .... are to some extent
necessary in order to resolve conflicts between panels. This
is the dominant concern. Moreover, the most constructive
way of resolving conflicts is to avoid them. Hence, insofar
as possible, determinations en banc are indicated whenever
it seems likely that a majority of all the active judges would
reach a different result than the panel assigned to hear a
case or which has heard it. Hearings en banc may be a
resort also in cases extraordinary in scale-either because
the amount involved is stupendous or because the issues are
intricate enough to invoke the pooled wisdom of the
circuit.
25
Standing alone, the italicized language would seem to be a
clear endorsement of the majoritarian use of en banc review.
Placed in context, however, Justice Frankfurter is limiting the
majoritarian use of en banc rehearings to situations where it will
serve the ultimate end of avoiding intra-circuit conflict.26 Thus, a
panel decision that resolves a legal question in a manner that is
unsatisfactory to the majority, and that will inevitably be a
source of intra-circuit conflict in the future, may rightly be
reversed. On the other hand, a panel decision that applies settled
23. See Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 334-35. It is interesting that the Court believed that
the en banc procedure would promote finality of decision. I agree with other commentators
who argue that frequent use of en banc rehearings detracts from finality because litigants
can never be sure if a victory at the panel stage is really the end of the lawsuit. See, e.g.,
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 6, at 1021.
24. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
25. See id. at 270-71 (emphasis added). The majority opinion uses language that is
consistent with Justice Frankfurter, albeit less well reasoned. The majority notes only that
en banc rehearings are "an important and useful device in the administration of justice,"
and that the Court had approved of en banc review in a case where a "conflict of views"
had arisen among a circuit court's judges. Id. at 260 n.20.
26. One commentator has observed that " [ulniformity has been described as 'the most
basic principle of jurisprudence.' This is because '[it] promotes the twin goals of equity and
judicial integrity."' Stein, supra note 6, at 821 n. 79-80 (quoting Henry J. Friendly,
Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982); Ruth B. Ginsburg & Peter
W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1424-25 (1987)).
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law to a certain set of facts should not be disturbed by a circuit
majority, because such decisions will have little or no effect on
future cases.
The Supreme Court's 1960 decision in American-Foreign
Steamship Corp.27 supports this interpretation of the rationale
behind the en banc process. In American-Foreign Steamship
Corp., the Court noted that "[t]he principal utility of
determinations by the courts of appeals in banc is to enable the
court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it
possible for a majority of its judges always to control and
thereby to secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions." 28
Thus, as in Western Pacific, majority control is less important as
an end in itself than as a way to achieve "uniformity and
continuity."
The promulgation of rule 35 in 1968 essentially codified
the rationales for en banc rehearings offered by the Supreme
Court. Significantly, rule 35 does not include a majoritarian
justification for rehearings. Instead, it states that "rehearing[s]
[are] not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered" unless one
of two exceptions applies.2 9 Because neither of these exceptions
endorses rehearings when a majority on the circuit simply
disagrees with the panel, a purely majoritarian use of the en banc
procedure is improper.
The first exception outlined in rule 35 states that rehearings
may be ordered "to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's
decisions."30 This exception is a codification of the Supreme
Court precedent discussed above, and clearly does not authorize
a majoritarian use of en banc rehearings.
Rule 35's second exception is that rehearings may be
ordered to resolve questions of "exceptional importance." 31 A
loose interpretation of this phrase could be used as evidence that
rehearings may serve as a majoritarian device, because a
question of "exceptional importance" could be defined as
anything that the majority believes is worth rehearing. However,
27. 363 U.S. 685 (1960).
28. Id. at 689-90 (emphasis added).
29. FED. R. APP. P. 35.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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such an expansive interpretation of the term "exceptional
importance" is inconsistent with the cautionary language used
by the Supreme Court and the Federal Rules in discussing the
propriety of en banc review. As noted previously, rule 35 states
that rehearings are "not favored and ordinarily will not be
ordered., 32  Similarly, Justice Frankfurter has observed that
"[r]ehearings are not a healthy step in the judicial process;
surely they ought not to be deemed a normal procedure." 3 3 This
guidance suggests that a more rigorous test of "exceptional
importance" is required.
Another possible interpretation of an exceptionally
important case is one in which the panel result is "clearly
erroneous." -4 Judges are accustomed to determining when
something is clearly erroneous, and there exists defining caselaw
as a guide. However, such a standard reduces the en banc court
to another layer of appellate review rather than a body that
establishes the direction of the legal doctrine of the circuit.
35
Accordingly, clearly erroneous panel rulings do not satisfy the
test for exceptional importance, and thus do not warrant en banc
review.
36
Perhaps the most useful test for an exceptionally important
case is whether or not it involves the creation of law rather than
the application of settled law to the facts of a case. The Court in
American-Foreign Steamship Corp. lent some credence to this
test when it noted that the en banc court should be employed
32. Id.
33. Western Pac. R.R. Corp. v. Western Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 270 (1953).
34. For a list of citations supporting the proposition that panel error should be
addressed by en banc treatment, see Solimine, supra note 18, at 48.
35. See, e.g., Western Pacific, 345 U.S. at 273-74 (Jackson, J., dissenting)
("Rehearings en banc are not appropriate where the effect is simply to interpose another
review by an enlarged Court of Appeals between decision by a conventional three-judge
court and petition to this Court. Delay, cost, and uncertainty, which take their toll of both
the successful and the unsuccessful, the just and the unjust litigant, are each increased by an
additional appeal to a hybrid intermediate court. Moreover, the fact that the court leaves the
precise nature of the right which it confers on the losing litigant so unsettled and equivocal
would lead me to conclude that the en banc question is one which the litigant should not be
given standing to raise."); United States v. Rosciano, 499 F.2d 173, 174 (7th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam) ("The function of en banc rehearings is not to review alleged errors for the
benefit of losing litigants.").
36. For a list of citations supporting the proposition that erroneous rulings do not justify
en banc treatment, see Solimine, supra note 18, at 48.
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when a question involves the "development of the law of the
circuit." 3 The Court also quoted approvingly from the lower
court decision, which viewed the purpose of the en banc to be
"that active circuit judges shall determine the major doctrinal
trends of the future for their court." 3
Evaluating whether a case merits en banc review by
determining whether new law is being created has several
adyantages. Most importantly, by definition, the creation of law
affects more than merely the interests involved in a case.39 Also,
it avoids subjective and time-bound determinations of
importance. Although the development of a relatively esoteric
area of law may seem unimportant today, that precedent will still
exist decades into the future if the once-esoteric area of law is
suddenly thrust into the limelight.
Law creation does suffer from an important drawback. As
Professor Solimine has pointed out, no two cases are identical,
and anytime settled law is applied to a new set of facts the court
could be said to be engaging in "law creation." 4 Nonetheless, it
should be possible to distinguish cases where law creation
involves a circuit court's "major doctrinal trends",4' from cases
where law creation results from application of settled law to a
new set of facts, with the former being the most likely
candidates for en banc review under the rubric of "exceptional
importance."
This review of the legal authority for en banc rehearings
indicates that rehearings are only proper to resolve intra-circuit
conflicts or issues of exceptional importance. A panel decision
that applies settled law to the facts of a case clearly does not
qualify for en banc review under either of these tests. Thus, en
banc reversals of panel decisions based solely on ideological
factors is improper. However, nothing in the underlying legal
authority requires en banc majorities to rehear each case that
qualifies for en banc review. Consequently, en banc majorities
are not prevented from relying on ideological factors in
37. 363 U.S. 685, 689 (1960).
38. Id.
39. See Solimine, supra note 18, at 53.
40. See id.
41. American Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. at 689.
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determining which exceptionally important cases to rehear and
which to let stand.
II. IDENTIFYING IDEOLOGICAL VOTING
Measuring ideology is difficult under the best of
circumstances. The concept comprises many dimensions, and
individuals who are conservative on one issue may be liberal on
another, either because they think through issues differently or
because their personal experiences compel inconsistency.
Nonetheless, "liberals" and "conservatives" do generally tend
to approach issues in a consistent manner,"2 and the concepts can
be useful if they are recognized as generalities.
Measuring ideology in the judicial context is particularly
difficult due to the doctrine of stare decisis. It is no doubt true
that judges generally do follow precedent. 43 Thus, for any given
decision, it is necessary to isolate the effect of ideology and the
effect of stare decisis.
The assumption underlying the measure of ideology used in
this article is that the ideological tendencies of judges are more
likely to surface in cases with dissents. If the rule of law is
obvious, judges will most likely vote unanimously to follow
precedent. However, if precedent is vague or not on point,
judges are more likely to rely on other factors, including their
ideological beliefs, in deciding cases. Similarly, when the law is
clear but facts weigh on both sides of an issue, judges may
consciously or unconsciously resort to ideology to assist in their
decisionmaking." Moreover, both the majority and minority
42. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Judicial Politics: Still a Distinctive Field, in POLITICAL
SCIENCE: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 189, 190 (Ada W. Finifter ed., 1983).
43. See infra Table 1 and accompanying text; see also Stein, supra note 4, at 847
(quoting a member of the bench who observed that "members of the federal judiciary
strive, most often successfully, to decide cases in accord with the law rather than with their
own ideological or partisan preferences").
44. For example, judges in the Ninth Circuit have acknowledged that judicial
philosophy plays a role in their evaluation of fact-specific determinations of the pain
suffered by disability claimants or the fear of persecution experienced by those fighting
deportation. Judges who believe that "it is not the judicial role to reverse every miscarriage
of justice" are probably more likely to accept agency findings adverse to the plaintiff.
Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate
Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915, 973-74 (1991).
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opinions in cases with dissents are likely to be more
comprehensive and forceful, if only because the writers feel
compelled to address the arguments of the other side.
Table 1 supports the proposition that cases with dissents are
more likely to involve ideological voting. To preview the
findings of Section IV, Judges Hall, Michael, Murnaghan, and
Butzner of the Fourth Circuit generally voted to favor liberal
interests in the sample of panel decisions studied in this article.45
However, every time combinations of these four judges came
together over a two-year period, they voted unanimously to
affirm conservative district court rulings, mostly on questions of
criminal law. This unanimity suggests that, regardless of judges'
ideology, they will conform to precedent when precedent is
clear. Controversial cases (i.e., those with dissents) are thus the
best avenue of expression for judicial ideology.
TABLE 1
VOTING BEHAVIOR OF PANELS COMPRISED OF LIBERAL JUDGES
FOURTH CIRCUIT, 1995-96
Panel Number District Panel Number Number
Members of Cases Court Decision of Full of Per
Opinions Curiam
Opinions
Hall 7 All Affirm all 0 7
Michael conservative
Mumaghan
Hall 7 All Affirm all 0 7
Michael conservative
Butzner
Michael 3 All Affirm all, 0 3
Mumaghan conservative one
Butzner modification
45. See infra Table 5.
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To identify panel decisions with a dissent, a Westlaw
search' of cases in the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of
Appeals was conducted for the years 1995 and 1996.4' Both
published and unpublished opinions were considered.48 Cases
were then classified as conservative, liberal, or non-ideological,
and the votes of each judge for conservative or liberal positions
were tallied. Cases were classified as liberal or conservative
based largely on the economic and social position of the
litigants.49 Generally, a vote for "the underdog," or the litigant
with fewer economic or social resources, was considered liberal,
while a vote for the party with more resources was considered
conservative.50 When the government was a litigant, the purpose
of government intervention was weighed. For example, though
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) arguably has more
influence than a small business, it stands in the shoes of
46. The databases were CTA4 and CTA5, and the search was: (judge s dissent!) &
da(199_).
47. The years 1995 and 1996 were chosen because the research for this article was
conducted in 1997, while the author was a law student at the University of Pittsburgh.
'Efforts to update this research to include later years are discussed below. See infra note 54.
48. The Fifth Circuit included very few unpublished opinions on Westlaw in 1995 and
1996. This practice is reflected in the different number of cases available for analysis in the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits (see Tables 3 and 4). One might expect unpublished opinions to
receive different treatment than published opinions. After all, unpublished opinions are not
precedential (though they do have persuasive value), and the panel must not have thought
the decision significant enough to have it published. However, as the data will show,
unpublished opinions in the Fourth Circuit constituted 40 percent of the cases granted en
banc review in 1995 (4 of 10). Since the Fourth Circuit does not appear to view
unpublished opinions as unimportant, they will be considered with published opinions.
49. See, e.g, Daniel J. Foley, Tennessee Supreme Court: A Statistical Analysis of an
Ideological Shift After the 1990 Election, 64 TENN. L. REV. 155, 159 (1996).
50. Using the nature of the party as a criterion for classification suggests that the result
of judicial decisionmaking was more important than the reasoning behind that
decisionmaking. For the most part, this is true. The influence of ideology is likely to be
unconscious, so explanations for behavior would not reflect its actual effect. At the same
time, judges' explanations for their votes were not completely ignored. For example, in
United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995), the panel majority affirmed the
defendant's conviction for possessing a machine gun. Id. at 792. Normally, a case affirming
a conviction would be classified as conservative. However, in Kirk, the panel majority also
upheld the constitutionality of the statute the defendant was found to have violated. Id at
797. The dissent argued that the Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to reach this
type of behavior, and emphasized its reluctance to allow "federal police power into every
village" in the United States. Id. at 802. Since it was clear that the dispute in Kirk was over
the scope of Congressional power, not the fate of the individual defendant, the decision was
classified as liberal.
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individual workers. Thus, a vote for the NLRB was deemed
liberal.
Another factor influencing case assignment was whether
the plaintiffs claim implied a larger or smaller role for
government and the courts in society. For example, the
economic and social resources of adversaries in a tort
proceeding may be identical. However, because a decision for
the plaintiff generally expands the role of the state in
individuals' lives, such votes were classified as liberal.
The effect of a case on federal-state relations also affected
its classification. Votes that favored an assertion of federal over
state power were generally seen as liberal, while votes in favor
of the states were viewed as conservative.
Finally, some cases were classified according to positions
staked out by adversaries in the "culture wars."5 For example,
votes for gay rights, affirmative action, or separation of church
and state (especially where fundamentalist Christians are
involved) were viewed as liberal." Table 1 includes an issue-by-
issue description of the coding scheme.
Some cases could not be classified as liberal or
conservative, and were therefore not included in the analysis.
For example, cases pitting one corporation against another in a
contract dispute or bankruptcy proceeding are generally non-
ideological. Similarly, cases in which entities such as hospitals
or business corporations seek clarification of dense statutory
language raise no ideological issues.
Ideological classification depended on the nature of the
controversy between the majority and dissent, not on the overall
51. For information on the "culture wars," see, e.g., ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF
THE AMERICAN MIND (1987); CULTURE WARS: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS (Fred Whitehead
ed. 1994); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991).
52. See, e.g., Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of America, Inc., 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996),
where the court held that a heterosexual male employee could sue his homosexual male
supervisor under Title VII for sexual harassment. Normally, a victory for the plaintiff in a
Title VII case would be considered liberal. However, because the holding of this case
adversely affects homosexuals, it was considered conservative. Similarly, in Chalmers v,
Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1996), the panel held that an evangelical
Christian did not state a claim for relief under Title ViI. This holding was classified as
liberal because the religious component of the case seemed more important than the Title
VII component.
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tenor of their opinions. If the majority reached a mix of
conservative and liberal conclusions, the classification of the
majority and dissenting opinions depended on the aspect of the
holding with which the dissent disagreed. For example, if the
majority found that a search was legal (conservative) but that
excessive force was used (liberal), and the dissent disagreed that
the force was excessive (conservative), the majority opinion
would be classified as liberal and the dissent conservative.
Similarly, if one portion of a dissent was liberal, in opposition to
a conservative majority finding, and another portion of the
dissent was conservative, in opposition to a liberal majority
finding, the case was entered into the database twice. 3
TABLE 2
Type of Case Liberal Conservative
14th Amendment Vote in favor of due Vote to deny due
process or equal process or equal
protection protection
1 st Amendment Vote for less control of Vote to allow some
expression restriction of expression
Civil Rights Vote for plaintiff Vote for defendant
(frequently police)
Criminal Vote for the accused Vote for law
enforcement
Employment benefits Vote to grant benefits Vote to deny benefits
(e.g. Black Lung Act)
Employment Vote for employee Vote for employer
discrimination (ADA,
ADEA, Title VII)
53. For example, in Beaver v. Netherland, 101 F.3d 977 (4th Cir. 1996), Judges Luttig
and Widener denied the defendant's motion for a stay of execution, with Judge Hall
dissenting. Id. at 980. Thus, the decision was classified as conservative. However, Judges
Hall and Widener agreed to grant the defendant's motion for more time to file a petition for
certiorari, with Judge Luttig dissenting. Id. Thus, the decision was also classified as liberal.
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Federalism (dispute Vote for power of Vote for power of state
between different levels federal government or local government
of government)
Habeas Corpus Vote to grant petition Vote to deny petition
Insurance Disputes Vote for the insured Vote for insurance
(only if an individual) company
Labor Vote for worker or Vote for the employer
NLRB
Negligence Vote to allow plaintiff's Vote to deny or limit
claim to proceed plaintiff's claim
Products liability Vote for plaintiff Vote for manufacturer
Voting rights Vote which favors Vote against
traditionally traditionally




Gay rights Vote for gay rights Vote against gay rights
Religious expression Vote opposing religious Vote favoring religious
expression expression
Affirmative action Vote for affirmative Vote against
action affirmative action
II. EN BANC TREATMENT OF LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE
PANEL DECISIONS
Once panel decisions with a dissent were identified and
classified as either liberal or conservative, their history was
traced to determine whether they were reversed by an en banc
rehearing. The data reveal that liberal panel victories were
reheard much more often than conservative panel victories, and
that every liberal decision that was reheard was also reversed.
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This section presents these findings in more detail, then
evaluates whether this ideological use of rehearings was
consistent with the underlying legal authority.
Table 3 shows that 14 of 47 (30%) of liberal panel
decisions with a dissent were reheard en banc in the Fourth
Circuit. Conversely, only 4 of 63 (6%) of conservative panel
decisions with a dissent were reheard. Results upon rehearing
are just as skewed. In the Fourth Circuit, each of the liberal
panel decisions reviewed by the full court was reversed, while
only 1 of 3 conservative victories were reversed.
TABLE 3
EN BANC REVERSALS OF PANEL DECISIONS
FOURTH CIRCUIT, 1995-1996
Panels Rehearing Number Number Percent
with En Banc Conserva- Liberal on Panel
Dissents tive on rehearing Reversed
rehearing
Liberal 47 14 14 0 30%
Conservative 63 4 3 1 2%
Non- 35 0 N/A N/A 0%
ideological
Total 145 18 17 1 N/A
Results in the Fifth Circuit are similar. Table 4 shows that 8
of 21 (38%) of liberal panel decisions with a dissent were
reheard, while no conservative panel decisions with a dissent
were reheard. Upon rehearing, each of the 8 liberal panel
decisions was reversed.
The "non-ideological" rows of Tables 3 and 4 can also be
used to assess the influence of ideology on en banc
decisionmaking. Although the use of panel decisions with a
dissent was meant to identify ideological voting, some cases
with dissents simply did not involve an ideological issue. Of
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these cases, none was even reviewed by an en banc court in
either circuit.
TABLE 4
EN BANC REVERSALS OF PANEL DECISIONS
FIFTH CIRCUIT, 1995-1996
Panels Rehearing Number Number Percent
with En Banc Conserva- Liberal on Panel
Dissents tive on rehearing Reversed
rehearing
Liberal 21 8 8 0 38%
Conservative 26 0 0 0 0%
Non- 23 0 N/A N/A 0%
ideological
Total 70 8 8 0 N/A
Tables 3 and 4 present clear evidence that ideology affected
the agenda of the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals. En
banc courts reviewed 22 liberal panel decision and only 4
conservative decisions in 1995 and 1996.14 Moreover, all 22
liberal panel decisions were reversed, while only one
conservative decision was reversed. Because there is no reason
to believe that questions worthy of en banc review appear only
in liberal panel decisions, it is reasonable to conclude that
ideology played a role in the selection of cases for rehearing.
The fact that ideology affects the selection of cases for en
banc review does not necessarily mean that the en banc process
is being used improperly. If a panel has decided a question of
exceptional importance or an intra-circuit conflict in a manner
favored by the en banc majority, it would generally be a waste of
judicial resources to rehear the case en banc, because the en
54. This pattern did not appear in 1997 and 1998. Explanations for this, such as
changes in the composition of the court, will be the subject of future research.
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banc result would be the same as the panel decision.5 This most
likely explains the difference in the rate with which liberal and
conservative panel decisions were selected for en banc review in
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits. This use of en banc rehearings,
although ideologically motivated, is not improper, as long as the
cases selected for review are exceptionally important or resolve
an intra-circuit conflict.
Tables 3 and 4 do raise the possibility that the en banc
process is being abused by ideological majorities to reverse
panel decisions that are not worthy of en banc review. If the
liberal panel decisions slated for review do not raise issues of
exceptional importance or intra-circuit conflict, then it is
reasonable to conclude that they were selected for rehearing
simply because the en banc majority disagreed with their
ideological tenor. As demonstrated in Section II, this use of the
en banc process is not contemplated by rule 35.
A brief review of the liberal panel decisions in Tables 3 and
4 suggests that the Fifth Circuit's use of en banc rehearings,
while ideologically motivated, was nonetheless proper because
the cases chosen for review involved questions that shaped the
law of the circuit. For example, the panel decision in United
States v. Blount?6 involved routine issues related to the law of
search and seizure." The court decided to rehear the case en
banc "to address the application of the Supreme Court's
decision in Illinois v. Gates," " and "to explain that the 'totality
of the circumstances' standard announced in Gates does not
impose a requirement of corroboration in all cases." 59 Thus,
even though the en banc court reversed a liberal panel decision,
it did so in a manner that developed the law of the circuit.
Similarly, in Grabowski v. Jackson County Public
Defenders,6° the panel majority held that a prisoner did not have
to show "deliberate indifference" to state a claim under 42
55. Of course, an en banc court may agree with the outcome of a panel decision while
at the same time expanding or contracting the scope of the panel's holding.
56. 98 F.3d 1489 (5th Cir. 1996).
57. Id. at 1495.
58. 123 F.3d 831, 832 (5th Cir. 1997).
59. Id. at 835.
60. 47 F.3d 1386 (5th Cir. 1995).
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U.S.C. § 1983.6' Instead, the panel majority ruled that the proper
test was whether the official action was "reasonably related to
legitimate institutional objectives, or whether it was arbitrary
and purposeless." '62 On rehearing, the en banc court held that
deliberate indifference was required.63 Because the choice of the
proper legal standard is clearly a -question of exceptional
importance, the use of an en banc rehearing in Grabowski was
proper.64 Thus, even if the rehearing of Grabowski moved the
law of the circuit in a conservative direction, the rehearing was
not an abuse of the en banc process.
The Fourth Circuit's use of en banc rehearings is similar. In
most cases, the liberal panel decisions that were reheard
qualified as "exceptionally important," and thus merited en
banc review.' 5 However, there are indications that the Fourth
Circuit used en banc rehearings in a more aggressive manner,
and reheard cases that were clearly not exceptionally important.
It may be useful to review two of these cases in more detail.
In Taft v. Vines,66 the plaintiffs were an African-American
woman and four minor children who were stopped by police
while driving home from a basketball game.6 ' The police, who
61. Id. at 1398.
62. Id.
63. Grabowski v. Jackson Co. Public Defenders Office, 79 F.3d 478, 479 (5th Cir.
1996).
64. In general, the liberal panel decisions that were reheard in the Fifth Circuit seemed
to address questions of exceptional importance. See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d
791, 797 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding statute constitutional under the Commerce Clause);
United States. v. Crouch, 51 F.3d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1995) (addressing standard used to
determine whether delay in criminal trial serves as basis for dismissing indictment); United
States v. McGuire, 79 F.3d 1396, 1400 (5th Cir. 1996) (addressing application of recent
Supreme Court decision to determine whether element of materiality had been presented to
jury).
65. See, e.g., Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 95 F.3d 353, 354 (4th Cir. 1996)
(addressing whether aliens can state a claim under Title VII for employment
discrimination); Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474, 1474 (4th Cir.
1996) (addressing whether school teacher's direction of school theater group was
protectable expression under 1st Amendment); Riley v. Dorton, 93 F.3d 113, 117 (4th Cir.
1996) (addressing whether "de minimis" nature of prisoner's injury precludes civil rights
claim); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., No. 93-1562, 1995 WL 25831 (4th Cir. Jan. 18, 1995)
(addressing whether Title VII's protection of "employees" also extended to former
employees).
66. 70 F.3d 304, 308 (4th Cir. 1995).
67. Id. at 308.
THE JOURNAL OF APPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS
were searching for an armed murder suspect, ordered each of the
plaintiffs out of the car and frisked them." The plaintiffs alleged
that the police touched them improperly during the search, and
that this constituted sexual abuse. 69 The plaintiffs sued the police
and other government officials for civil rights violations. °
The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants.7 The panel reversed in part, finding that the amount
of force used by the police officers may have been
unreasonable.72 A dissenting panel opinion evaluated the facts of
the case and concluded that the amount of force used by police
officers was not excessive.73 Significantly, the dissent did not
argue that the majority's decision would have far-reaching
implications. In fact, the dissent noted that "[a]pplication of the
qualified immunity defense to a claim of excessive force
'requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each
particular case."' 74 Thus, the dissent recognized that the case
required the application of settled law to the facts of the case.
Nonetheless, the liberal panel decision was reversed en banc,
with the en banc court simply adopting the dissenting panel
opinion as its own in a per curiam decision.75
76United States v. Torres provides another example of the
Fourth Circuit rehearing a case en banc even though the case
involved only the application of settled law to facts. In Torres,
the issue was whether police had reasonable suspicion to search
the defendant's duffel bags for drugs. The panel found that
reasonable suspicion did not exist. The en banc court, in another
per curiam opinion, merely affirmed the district court's finding
that reasonable suspicion existed.
Taft and Torres indicate that, in certain cases, en banc
majorities in the Fourth Circuit have taken a more aggressive
68. Id. at 309.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 306.
71. Id. at 310.
72. Id. at 315.
73. Id. at 321.
74. Id. at 319 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
75. Taft v. Vines, 83.F.3d 681 (4th Cir. 1996).
76. 65 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir. 1995).
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approach to the use of rehearings." Overall, though, a review of
the liberal panel decisions that were reversed suggests that the
majority of them could be classified as exceptionally important,
and thus deserving of en banc review.
In summary, the data in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that
ideology can play a significant role in agenda setting on a court
of appeals by influencing the types of cases that are reheard en
banc. However, a review of the liberal panel decisions that were
reversed also suggests that the large majority of those decisions
qualified as exceptionally important. Thus, although en banc
rehearings may have been used ideologically to shape the law of
the circuit, this use of the process was not inconsistent with the
legal authority for rehearings.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL USE OF
EN BANC REHEARINGS
En banc decisions constitute only a small percentage of the
decisions issued by the courts of appeals.7" Thus, even if the
methodology developed in the previous section identifies a
pattern of ideological en banc decisionmaking, one may argue
that such a pattern is of little consequence. For example, even if
a conservative majority reverses 10 of 10 liberal panel decisions
that the court rehears in a given year, the en banc rehearing is a
relatively ineffectual enforcer of ideological homogeneity if 100
liberal panel decisions do not get reversed. The question, then, is
whether the liberal panel victories that are reversed by en banc
rehearings constitute a significant percentage of liberal panel
victories.
77. See Spicer v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 66 F.3d 705 (4th Cir. 1995). In Spicer,
the issue before the court was the fact-sensitive determination of whether an employer had
acted immediately and effectively to halt sexually harassing conduct by employees. The
majority argued that en banc review of the panel decision was proper because a finding of
liability under the facts of the case "would have effected a significant change to Title VII
jurisprudence." Id. at 711. The dissent argued that en banc review was improper, given the
clarity of the guiding principles of law, and that "[t]he light we shed here is not worth the
thirteen-judge candle." Id. at 714; see also Cooper v. Taylor, 70 F.3d 1454, 1456 (4th Cir.
1995) (addressing whether admission of taped confession was harmless error).
78. See Christopher P. Banks, The Politics of En Banc Review in the Mini-Supreme
Court, 13 J.L. & POL. 377, 394 (1997) (" [B]etween 1970 and 1995 en banc sittings
represented, on average, less than one-half of one percent of the circuit court's docket.").
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This section concludes that the use of en banc rehearings in
the Fourth Circuit did have a significant effect on a liberals'
chances of winning. Subsection B analyzes a sample of cases in
selected areas of law, and finds that rehearings reduced the
number of "true" liberal victories from 14 to 8. This suggests
that en banc rehearings can be an effective enforcer of the
majority's ideological preferences.
The sample of cases analyzed in subsection B is not limited
to cases with dissents, because the goal of the analysis is to
determine whether en banc rehearings can affect the overall
ideological character of a court's output. However, the analysis
of unanimous panel decisions presents certain problems. As
noted above, judges generally adhere to precedent. The use of
cases with dissents in Section II was intended to separate the
effects of stare decisis from ideology. Because subsection B
includes unanimous panel decisions, some other method must be
devised to separate the effects of stare decisis from ideology.
The method developed in subsection B to accomplish this
goal considers the composition of the panel and the votes of
each judge to identify ideological voting. For example, if three
conservative judges reached a liberal result, it seems reasonable
to conclude that the decision was controlled by stare decisis, not
ideology. On the other hand, if three liberal judges reached a
liberal result, it is at least possible that ideology influenced the
outcome of the case. Of course, this methodology requires that
each judge be classified as liberal or conservative. That task is
the topic of subsection A.
A. Voting Patterns of Individual Judges
This subsection tallies the votes of judges in each of the
panel decisions analyzed in Section II. The cases from Section II
were used because cases with a dissent were thought to be more
likely to involve ideological voting.
Table 5 displays the results for judges in the Fourth Circuit.
The data indicate that most of the judges participating in cases
with dissents routinely favored either liberal or conservative
interests.
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Table 6 presents the findings for the Fifth Circuit.
Unfortunately, the data are insufficient to classify many of its
judges as liberal or conservative. Table 6 indicates that five
judges generally voted to favor liberal interests in the cases
under review while six judges tended to favor conservative
interests. The other 10 members of the court cannot easily be
labeled as liberal or conservative.
As noted above, the Fifth Circuit generally did not include
unpublished opinions on Westlaw, so there were fewer cases
available for analysis. 9 Moreover, judges in the Fifth Circuit
appear to dissent less frequently than judges in the Fourth
Circuit.0 To overcome this problem, votes from 1997 were
added to the analysis.8' However, the data are still generally
inadequate to identify the voting patterns (if any) of individual
judges in the Fifth Circuit.
79. See supra note 51.
80. To determine the frequency with which judges dissented, a Westlaw search was
used to identify the total number of reported panel decisions in which a judge participated,
along with the number of dissents issued by that judge. The results indicate that from 1995
to 1997, 105 of 2,359 (4.4%) reported panel decisions in the Fourth Circuit included a
dissent. By contrast, only 78 of 5,208 (1.5%) reported panel decisions in the Fifth Circuit
contained a dissent.
81. Because the Fifth Circuit is not being compared with the Fourth Circuit, the
difference in the time frame for the two was not thought to create a problem.
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This subsection indicates that the voting patterns of
individual judges on the Fourth Circuit are relatively clear. Thus,
this information can be used in subsection B to assist in
determining whether selected panel decisions were influenced
by ideology or stare decisis. However, because there are an
insufficient number of dissenting panel opinions in the Fifth
Circuit, it will not be included in subsection B.
B. En Banc Reversals of Liberal Victories.
In the next step of the analysis, a sample of 99 Fourth
Circuit cases addressing civil rights, employment discrimination,
and habeas petitions was gathered.82 These areas of law were
chosen partly because of their relatively clear ideological
dimensions, and partly because of the ease with which a sample
of cases could be obtained from Westlaw."3 Decisions favoring
the civil rights plaintiff, employee, or habeas petitioner were
classified as liberal, while decisions favoring the defendant in
civil rights cases (usually a governmental entity), employers, or
the state were classified as conservative.
Table 7 reveals the extent to which conservative decisions
predominate in the Fourth Circuit. Approximately 75 percent of
panel decisions could be considered conservative. More
important for purposes of this article, however, is the fact that
almost one-third of liberal victories were later reversed by en
82. The Westlaw searches originally yielded 108 cases from the Fourth Circuit.
However, 9 cases with mixed results (part liberal, part conservative) were excluded from
the analysis. None of the cases with mixed results were reheard en banc.
83. The searches used were:
civil rights-da(1995, 1996) & sy(" civil rights" 1983)
employment discrimination-da(1995, 1996) & sy("title vii" ADA ADEA) %
sy(" civil rights" 1983)
habeas--da(1995, 1996) & sy(habeas) % sy("title vii" ADA ADEA "civil
rights" 1983)
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banc rehearings. Instead of winning 25 cases in these areas of
law during 1995-96, liberals only won 17 such cases.
TABLE 7
TOTAL PANEL DECISIONS AND EN BANC TREATMENT
(EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, HABEAS, AND CIVIL RIGHTS)
FOURTH CIRCUIT, 1995-1996
Panel result" Number of Panel Number Reheard Number Reversed
Decision En Banc
Conservative, 63 0 0
unanimous
Conservative, 11 1 0
with dissent
Total 74 1 0
conservative
Liberal, 14 1 1
unanimous
Liberal, 11 7 7
with dissent
Total liberal 25 8 8
Total 99 9 9
As noted above, judges do not ignore the law and simply
vote their ideological preferences.85 In many cases, the law only
allows one outcome. Thus, many of the conservative panel
"victories" in Table 7 were reached with the approval of one,
two, or even three of the Fourth Circuit's more liberal members.
Of course, this phenomenon would also apply to liberal
victories, with a certain number of them obtained with the
approval of one or more conservatives. To the extent that this is
the case, the liberal victories in Table 7 become that much less
impressive. If the only liberal panels that avoided en banc
reversal were those that included one or more conservatives on
84. This table excludes 9 "mixed" cases, in which one aspect of the holding was
conservative and another liberal.
85. See supra Table 1 for data showing that combinations of the most liberal judges on
the Fourth Circuit routinely voted to affirm conservative district court rulings.
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the panel majority, it could be argued that the panel was not
ideological, and was instead following a relatively clear rule of
law. On the other hand, if a panel composed of three liberals
avoided reversal, it is at least possible that the decision was
ideological. Although three liberals reaching a liberal result
could still be explained by a rule of law that allowed only one
outcome, in such cases there is at least a stronger possibility of
ideological voting.
Table 8 identifies the composition of the 14 panels from the
Fourth Circuit that unanimously reached a liberal result in 1995-
96. Based on the data in Table 5, conservative members of the
court have been italicized and liberal members bolded. Judges
sitting by designation have been treated as neutral (neither italics
nor bold), as have Judges Phillips and Wilkins.86 A liberal result
in the unanimous cases listed in Table 8 was potentially a "true"
liberal win if there were no conservative members on the panel.
If the unanimous panel did include a conservative, the
assumption is that the law demanded a liberal outcome
regardless of the ideologies of the judges, and the result is not a
"true" liberal win. The data show that only 7 of the 14 cases
qualify as liberal wins as defined in this subsection.
TABLE 8
FOURTH CIRCUIT, 1995-1996
Unanimous Liberal Panels Potential "true" En Banc
liberal win? Result
Russell Motz Lay No
Lutti, Williams Chasanow No
Ervin Wilkins Michael (Dist. J.) Yes
Ervin Wilkins Michael Yes
Hall Murnaghan Butzner Yes
Ervin Michael Messitte Yes
Ervin Wilkins Williams No
Hamilton Williams Motz No
86. The data from Table 5 on Judge Wilkins suggests that he tended to vote
conservative in panel decisions with a dissent. However, given the small number of votes
available for him and my desire to err on the side of caution, I treated him as neutral.
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Unanimous Liberal Panels Potential "true" En Banc
liberal win? Result
Phillips Ervin Murnaghan Yes Conservative
Butzner Motz Hall Yes
Russell Chapman,, Beaty No
Murnaghan Hamilton Phillips No
Hall Michael Chapman Yes
Table 9 includes the same data for Fourth Circuit panels
that reached a liberal result over the dissenting vote of one
member. To be counted as a "true" liberal win when a dissent is
present, the dissent must be conservative and the majority
composed of either two liberals or a liberal and a neutral. The
dissenting member has been underlined.
TABLE 9
FOURTH CIRCUIT, 1995-1996
Liberal Panels with Dissent Potential "true" En Banc
liberal win? Result
Murnaghan Michael Williams Yes Conservative
Ervin Russell Norton Yes Conservative
Niemeyer Michael Motz Yes
Wilkinson Michael Norton Yes Conservative
Wilkinson Hall Butzner Yes
Murnaghan Motz Young No Conservative
Williams Michael Motz No
Hall Niemeyer Hamilton No
Murnaghan Motz Niemeyer Yes Conservative
Murnaghan Lay Hamilton Yes Conservative
Niemeyer Hamilton Motz No Conservative
Table 9 shows that 7 of 11 liberal panel results with a
dissent meet the criteria for a "true" liberal decision. The four
cases that do not qualify either have a liberal member dissenting
from a liberal result and/or a conservative member joining the
majority in reaching a liberal decision. Of the 7 "true" liberal
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cases with a dissent, 5 were reversed by the en banc court. Of
the 4 other liberal decisions with a dissent, 2 were reversed."7
Taken together, Tables 8 and 9 show that 14 of the 25
liberal decisions in the sample of cases qualify as "true" liberal
decisions. The other 11 cases may be liberal in that they favor
the civil rights plaintiff, the employee, or the habeas petitioner,
but the composition of the panels suggests that these 11 cases
were less likely to have been decided on ideological grounds. Of
the 14 "true" liberal decisions, 6 were reversed by the en banc
court. Thus, the en banc process was used to reduce the number
of liberal panel victories in the sample by almost one-half, from
14 to 8.
V. CONCLUSION
This article indicates that ideological majorities on a court
of appeals can and do use en banc rehearings to set the court's
agenda and shape the law of the circuit. The findings here do not
suggest that judges ignore precedent and vote according to their
ideological preferences, because the evidence of ideological
voting occurred in a narrow subset of cases where, presumably,
precedent was either vague or not on point. However, this
research does suggest that there are important outlets for the
expression of judges' ideological preferences, and that judges
will make use of these opportunities. As distasteful as it may be
for some to acknowledge that ideology can influence judicial
decisionmaking, the evidence presented here suggests that such
influence cannot be ignored.
87. In a perfectly ideological world, all of the "true" liberal decisions would have been
reversed by the en banc court. That they were not is further evidence of the fact that judges
do not vote solely according to ideology.

